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ABSTRACT: Abduction can be intended as a special kind of deductive consequence. In fact a general trend is to 
consider it as a backward deduction with some additional conditions. However, there can be more than one 
kind of deduction, so that any definition of abduction must take that into account. From a logical perspec-
tive the problem is precisely the formalization of conditions when the deductive consequence is fixed. In 
this paper, we adopt Makinson’s method to define new consequence relations, hence abduction is defined 
as a reverse relation corresponding to each one of such relations.  
Keywords: abduction, explicative relations, pivotal consequences, structural rules.  
 
1. Supra-classical consequence relations 
1.1. Classical consequence 
As it is well known, the classical consequence relation is defined from a formal lan-
guage and is characterized by several structural rules. We are following in part Makin-
son (2003) to present requisites that a deductive consequence relation must accom-
plish, so we consider a propositional formal language L —to abbreviate L also repre-
sents the set of all its formulae— that contains a set of propositional variables, the 
falsehood ⊥, and, at least, the connective →, the material implication. x ∈ L repre-
sents that x is a formula of L and A ⊆ L that A is a set of formulae of L. A valuation 
ν: L {0, 1} is a function that assigns one of the truth values to every propositional 
variable and is in accordance with truth tables for molecular formulae constructed 
using the corresponding connectives. Given a set of formulae A ⊆ L  and a valuation 
ν, if ν(a) = 1 for every a ∈ A, then ν(A) = 1 will be written. Whatever the valuation ν 
may be, according to that, ν(∅) = 1.  
a
In general, a consequence relation is defined as a subset of ℘(L) × L. Since for-
mulae of L may represent certain propositions that are relevant in determined inferen-
tial contexts, it is a relation between sets of formulae and formulae that represents a 
relation between sets of propositions and propositions. Concretely, in the case of the 
classical consequence, given A ⊆ L and x ∈ L, one says that x is classical consequence of 
A if and only if —“iff”, from now on— for all valuations ν, if ν(A) = 1, then ν(x) = 
1, in symbols A  x. If ∅  x, then ν(x) = 1 for every valuation ν and, following the 
classical point of view, we shall say that in this case x is a tautology but when x  z  
for all z ∈ L, then x is a contradiction.  
When A has only one element, that is to say, when A = {a}, we shall write a  x  
instead of {a} x. Similarly, if A, B ⊆ L and x ∈ L, our usual notation will be A, B  
x or A ∪ B  x. Another way of defining consequence is to take it as an operation 
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Cn:℘(L) L, though both representations are interchangeable: given the relation  
and any set A ⊆ L, Cn(A) = {x ∈ L| A  x}, and, reciprocally, given Cn,  is defined 
by the condition A  x  iff  x ∈ Cn(A). To simplify, the format of relation is defini-
tively adopted through the paper. The classical consequence accomplishes conditions 
that are known as structural rules. These are the following ones, for a, b, x ∈ L and 
A, B ⊆ L:  
a
• Reflexivity: A  a, for all a ∈ A 
• Cut: if A  b for all b ∈ B and A ∪ B  x, then A  x 
• Monotony: If A  x and A ⊆ B, then B  x 
 So, the classical relation is a closure relation, since it verifies the indicated condi-
tions. Other important characteristics of that relation are  
• Compactness: If A  x, then there is a finite A’ ⊆ A such that A’  x 
• Uniform substitution: For the usual uniform substitution σ —defined as 
σ : L L—, if A  x, then σ(A)  σ(x), where σ(A) = {σ(a)| a ∈ A}  a
 Taking the classical closure relation other ones can be defined. This will be used to 
tackle the problem of abduction from a logical point of view.  
1.2. New consequence relations 
Following the way initialized in Makinson (2003), some ways to obtain new relations 
could be described, so we consider other consequence relations: the so called pivotal-
assumptions, pivotal-valuations and pivotal-rules consequences.  
Let  be the classical consequence relation. For K ⊆ L, A ⊆ L and x ∈ L, we say 
that x is consequence (in the sense of ) of A modulo K iff x is consequence of 
K ∪ A, in symbols A K x  iff A ∪ K  x. This is a pivotal-assumption consequence, 
which may capture inferences in which some premises are assumed though they are 
not ever explicit. Of course, K is a supraclassical relation, that is to say, it accom-
plishes reflexivity, cut and monotony —and compactness, in this case. However, 
though the classical consequence relation is closed under substitution, not all supra-
classical consequence relations are closed under substitution. For K , A K x, but 
there can be a substitution σ such that σ(A) /K σ(x). In fact —given a language L— 
there is no supraclassical consequence relation that is closed under substitution except 
to the classical itself —and the total ℘(L) × L—, as indicated in Makinson (2003).  
Let  be the classical consequence relation, V the class of all valuations, and con-
sider W ⊂ V, then a pivotal-valuation consequence W is such that for A ⊂ L and x ∈ 
L, A W x iff for all ν ∈ W, if ν(A) = 1, then ν(x) = 1. This relation is not closed under 
substitution. In fact, from the supraclassical consequence relation K , it is possible to 
find W ⊂ V  such that K = W . When K = ∅ and W = V, such result is trivial. Let K 
and W be such that K ⊂ L, K ≠ ∅ and W = {ν ∈ V | ν(K) = 1}, then for every x ∈ L, 
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A K x  iff  K ∪ A  x  iff  for every ν ∈ V, if ν(K ∪ A) = 1, then ν(x) = 1, but this 
holds for every valuation of W, so the former is equivalent to A W x. Finally, given a 
supraclassical consequence relation W , if it is compact, then there can be K ⊆ L such 
that  K = W . 
Finally, consider that instead of adding assumptions or valuations, a set of rules is 
taken, which is a relation defined in L, that is to say, the set of rules R has elements of 
the form (a, x), where a, x ∈ L, so R ⊂ L2, or, which is the same, R ∈℘(L2 ). For A ⊂ 
L, R(A) = {y ∈ L| there is x ∈ A and (x, y) ∈ R}. A ⊆ L is closed under a set R of 
rules iff for all x ∈ L, if x ∈ A and (x, y) ∈ R, then y ∈ A, in other words, iff R(A) ⊆ 
A. Now let  be the classical consequence relation, a pivotal-rules consequence rela-
tion, or a consequence relation modulo a set of rules R, is defined as follows, for A ⊂ 
L and x ∈ L: A R x  iff  x ∈ A’ for every A’ such that A ⊆ A’, and R(A’) ⊆ A’ —x 
∈ A’, for every superset A’ of A such that it is closed under the corresponding supra-
classical consequence operation and the set of rules R. Pivotal-rules consequences, like 
previous pivotal consequences, have the mentioned structural rules and may verify 
compactness.  
2. Explicative relations 
The slogan “no abduction without deduction” suggests a clear way to obtain solutions 
of abductive problems by developing the corresponding work that starts with a deduc-
tive consequence so considered. However, according to Kapitan’s thesis —as summa-
rized in (Hintikka 1999, p. 91)— abduction should be seen as an inferential process 
though it is neither deduction nor induction, therefore the formal method to tackle it 
would be specific. So, an abductive logic will be defined, with universality pretensions 
in a similar way than in Beziau (2005), by means of a relation too, though this will not 
be a subset of ℘(L) × L but a subset of ℘(L) × ℘(L), or an operation C*: 
℘(L) ℘(℘(L)). a
 In scientific literature the concept of “abduction” is used to refer a variety of ex-
planatory processes and, taking it as an inference, there are various styles according to 
requirements for that, as studied in Aliseda (1997) and Aliseda (2006). First we shall 
define a new relation in order to capture a weak form of abduction —the most ba-
sic—, then methods for other forms will be able to be developed.  
 Given the propositional formal language L, let  be the classical relation. α is 
defined in ℘(L), that is to say, α ⊆ ℘(L) × ℘(L), which for A, B ⊂ L must accom-
plish the condition A α B iff B  a, for all a ∈ A. This could be read as “the set A is 
explained by B” or “the set B explains A”. Since this notion has no restriction about 
the extension of A and B, ∅ α B —B  x for all x ∈ ∅—, which represents that the 
empty set of formulae is (vacuously) explained by any set of formulae. When A α ∅, 
every element of A has the characteristic that has been called “tautological” in terms 
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of classical logic. On the other hand, if L α A, then every element of A is a “contra-
diction”, since A  x for all x ∈ L.  
 The relation α has some structural rules that are justified from basic ones of the 
corresponding . For any A, B, C ⊂ L, such basic rules are:  
• Reflexivity: A α A. Each set of formulae explains itself. Given α , since 
A  a, for all a ∈ A, A α A.  
• Right cut: if C α A ∪ B and B α A, then C α A. Given α , suppose that 
C α A ∪ B and B α A, by definition A, B  c and A  b, for all c ∈ C and 
b ∈ B respectively, then by cut of , A  c for all c ∈ C, so that C α A.  
• Right monotony: if A α B, then A α B ∪ C. When a set is explicative, its su-
persets are also explicative. Suppose that A α B, by definition B  a for all a 
∈ A and, by monotony of , B ∪ C  a for all a ∈ A, so that A α B ∪ C.  
 Another important property derives from compactness of the basic classical rela-
tion. Let  be the classical relation that verifies compactness and α the abductive 
relation defined as above, for A, B ⊂ L, if A α B and A is finite —in symbols |A| < 
ω0 —, then there exists B’ ⊆ B such that |B’ | < ω0 and A α B’. Suppose that A α B  
and |A| < ω0 , then by definition B  a for all a ∈ A, so there is Ba ⊆ B for every a ∈ 
A such that |Ba | < ω0 and Ba  a. Then define B’ = U a∈A Ba, but B’  a for every a ∈ 
A and |B’ | < ω0, because of which A α B’.  
 Such structural rules are basic and express the essential characteristics of the expli-
cative relation α . Though each of them has been defined taking into account the 
underlying consequence relation ‘ , they are primitive because no one of them is de-
rived from another, but some derived rules can be obtained. For X, Y, Z, Q ⊂ L, and 
separating antecedent and consequent by a line when necessary, the following rules are 
proved as derived  
• Isotonicity,  
X α Y, Z α Q 
X ∪ Z α Y ∪ Q
:
1. X α Y, premise 
2. Z α Q, premise  
3. X ∪ Z α X ∪ Z, reflexivity  
4. X ∪ Z α X ∪ Z ∪ Y ∪ Q, right monotony (3)  
5. X α Y ∪ Z ∪ Q, right monotony (1)  
6. X ∪ Z α Y ∪ Z ∪ Q, right cut (4, 5)  
7. Z α Y ∪ Q, right monotony (2)  
8. X ∪ Z α Y ∪ Q, right cut (6,7)  
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• Thinning,  
X ∪ Z α Y
X α Y 
:
1. X ∪ Z α Y, premise  
2. X α X, reflexivity  
3. X α X ∪ Y ∪ Z, right monotony (2)  
4. X α Y, right cut (1,3)  
• Unity of explanation, 
X α Y, Z α Y
X ∪ Z α Y :
1. X α Y, premise 
2. Z α Y, premise  
3. X ∪ Z α Y ∪ Y, isotonicity (1,2),  
4. X ∪ Z α Y, since Y ∪ Y = Y for all Y ⊆ L.  
• A form of left transitivity,  
X α Y, Z α X
X ∪ Z α Y 
:
1. X α Y, premise  
2. Z α X, premise  
3. Z α Y ∪ X, right monotony (2)  
4. Z α Y, right cut (2,3)  
5. X ∪ Z α Y, isotonicity (4,5)  
• Reflexivity of parts of explanations, X α X ∪ Y:  
1. X α X, reflexivity 
2. X α X ∪ Y, right monotony (1)  
• Explication of  ∅, ∅ α X:  
1. ∅ α ∅, reflexivity  
2. ∅ α ∅ ∪ X, right monotony (1)  
3. ∅ α X, since ∅ ∪ X = X for all X ⊆ L  
 Since there can be other consequence relations, new explicative consequences can 
be defined if we considerer pivotal-assumptions, pivotal-valuations and pivotal-rules 
consequences. So, given K ⊂ L,  
A α, K B  iff  B K a for all a ∈ A. 
Given the set of valuations W,  
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A α, W B  iff  B W a for all a ∈ A. 
Finally, for a set of rules R,  
A α, R B  iff  B R a for all a ∈ A. 
 Since basic rules of α depend on the structural rules of , and K , W and R 
share such structural rules, the explicative relations α, K , α, W and α, R also have the 
basic rules of  α . Besides, the studied derived rules also can be proved.  
3. Abduction and explicative relations 
3.1 Explicative solutions of abductive problems 
In general, for A ⊂ L and y ∈ L, <A, y> represents an abductive problem with respect to 
a consequence relation  . Then, the set of solutions S is defined as  
S = {x ∈ L | {y}α  A ∪ {x}}. 
 In terms of explicative relation, S is the set of solutions iff {y}α A ∪ S, that is to 
say, an abductive problem can be seen as the problem of explicating by means of a 
consequence relation y from A and a set S that must be obtained. When the conse-
quence relation is a pivotal consequence, then the set of solutions S could be defined 
taking into account a set of sentences K, a set of valuations W or a set of rules R, and 
it would be verified that  
• {y}α, K  A ∪ S,  
• {y}α, W  A ∪ S,  
• {y}α, R  A ∪ S,  
according to the kind of pivotal consequence taken to define the explicative relation.  
By using the same terminology than in Aliseda (1997) and Aliseda (2006), consider 
the following sets: T, F, S ⊂ L, called “theory”, “facts” —initially, F has only one ele-
ment— and “solutions”, respectively. From the pivotal assumption relation T , let 
α, T be the corresponding explicative relation, then a general abductive problem can 
be tackled in terms of explicative relations, so <T, F> represents a general abductive 
problem with respect to the consequence relation T . Abductive problems, as pre-
sented in Aliseda (1997) and Aliseda (2006) are general abductive problems in which F 
is unitary (in Kakas et al (1993) it is the same with respect to the general case, when no 
additional restriction is imposed to S). Given a such general abductive problem, <T, 
F>, the following conditions characterize different types of solutions:  
• Plain:  
1. F  α, T S,  
• Consistent:  
1. F  α, T S,  
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2. L  /α, T S,  
• Explicative:  
1. F  α, T S,  
2. F  /α, ∅ S  or  F /α, S ∅ 
• Minimal:  
1. F  α, T S,  
2. F  /α, T S’, for all S’ ⊂ S  
3.2 Consistent explicative abduction 
In Accordance with the given classification, by combinations of requisites, for a gen-
eral abductive problem <T, S>, a consistent explicative abduction must be defined 
accomplishing  
1. F  α, T S,  
2. L  /α, T S,  
3. F  /α, ∅ S  or F /α, S ∅  
 Then the set S of solutions should be defined as  
S = {x ∈ L |  F  α, T {x} &  x  /T  ⊥  &  x  /T  y } 
 In fact this is one of the most interesting forms of abduction, since it represents a 
current inferential pattern of scientific argumentation. Methodology of scientific 
knowledge suggests that given a theory T, which can be seen as a set of sentences of a 
specialized language, and a fact that could be explained in terms of T, this fact must be 
represented as a sentence of such language with some syntactical relation with T, since 
such fact has to be related with the set of facts captured by T. Taking that into ac-
count, a general definition of abductive problem should include a syntactical prerequi-
site. So, given R ⊂ ℘(L) ×℘(L), which verifies certain syntactical requisites, for ex-
ample that for every <X, Y> ∈ R, if y ∈ Y, then there must be x ∈ X such that x and 
y share propositional variables, and given a theory T ⊂ L, <T, F> is a general abduc-
tive problem iff <T, F> ∈ R. Then, in general, the set of solutions should be defined 
as follows  
S = {x ∈ L | <T, {x}> ∈ R  &  F  α, T {x} &  x  /T  ⊥  &  x  /T  y } 
 Some characterizations of abduction give criteria to restrict the set of solutions: 
using integrity constraints, specifying criteria of preference, crucial literals, etc., —see 
Kakas et al. 1993, p. 4. In order to capture some of restricted forms of abduction, piv-
otal consequences could be took, for example if a set I ⊂ L of integrity constraints, 
then a useful explicative consistent relation should be α, T with the additional condi-
tion that I α, T , since it must be verified that S T I. Restrictions about valuations or 
inference rules could be captured by means of  α, W  and α, R , respectively.  
 
Ángel NEPOMUCENO-FERNÁNDEZ, Fernando SOLER-TOSCANO 292 
A question arises about methods to obtain the set of solutions, for example, in the 
sense of consistent explicative abduction, namely whether there is some calculus that 
could be defined. A precise answer depends on the consequence relation that is been 
used. As we said above, L has at least a symbol for material implication, that is to say 
→. The studied classical relation accomplishes the operative rule called modus ponens: 
for A ⊂ L and x, y ∈ L, K ⊂ L, a set of valuations W and a set of rules R,  
A  x → y, A  x
A  y .
 Such relation also verifies the so called deduction theorem, which must indicate the pro-
totypical style of inference (some interesting reflections about that in van Benthem 
1993):  
A, x  y 
A  x → y .
 Reciprocally, let us see how it is verified  
A  x → y
A, x  y :
  1. A  x → y, premise  
  2.  A, x  x, reflexivity  
  3.  A, x  x → y, monotony  
  4.  A, x  y, modus ponens 2, 3.  
 On the other hand, the classical consequence relation  has the following opera-
tive rules, the ⊥-rules, for A ⊂ L and x ∈ L:  
• First ⊥-rule: A  x  iff  A, x → ⊥  ⊥.  
• Second ⊥-rule (combining with →):  
A, y  x; A, y  z 
A, (x → ⊥) → y  z .
 By working with classical consequence relation, semantic tableaux method has 
been used in Aliseda (1997), Aliseda (2006) and Reyes et al (2006) and dual resolution 
is the calculus for abduction introduced Soler et al (2006). On the other hand, K , W 
and R , defined as supraclassical consequence relations, verify modus ponens and deduc-
tion theorem, and such first and second ⊥-rules could be settled. In general, the 
following proposition allows to apply any deductive calculus,  
It is sufficient condition to obtain solutions of general abductive problems by means of a deductive 
calculus that:  
• the corresponding consequence relation verifies modus ponens, deduction theorem and ⊥-rules,  
• the calculus must be sound and complete.  
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